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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study the influence of corporate environmental responsibility
(CER) and national environmental standards on the location choices of the 600 biggest
European firms. By using the environmental score provided by Vigeo , we are able to test
the influence of the environmental performances of firms. We find a negative interaction
effect between these environmental performances and national environmental regulations.
Thus, we argue that national standards can be a substitute for CER. All things being
equal, firms with better environmental performances tend to be located in dirtier countries.
CER can therefore be seen as an answer to the location choices of firms which invest in
countries with poor environmental policies. This result is only valid when considering de
facto environmental standards, not de jure environmental standards. It suggests a possible
strategic behavior of firms which exploit these differences between formal environmental
regulations and their effective enforcement.
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1 Introduction
The media, public opinion as well as researchers have been showing an increasing interest for
the question of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Growing concerns about climate change,
and more generally about the environment, have changed the perception of the responsibility of
multinational companies. On the one hand, they are officially part of international discussions
on this topic. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development aims at promoting their
initiatives, while the United Nations encourages their involvement through the Global Compact,
and the 2002 Earth Summit put a strong emphasis on their possible contribution towards sus-
tainable development. But on the other hand, multinational companies have also been accused of
exporting their pollution to developing countries, or relocating when environmental regulations
become too tight. This is the so-called pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). Their responsibilities
are therefore discussed as their goodwill is questioned, and many of these companies suffer from
a negative image in public opinion. The location decisions of firms may have a strong impact on
this image, but Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) can also influence it and there-
fore contribute to changing this perception. It is therefore important to study the interactions
between CER and national environmental standards in the location choices made by firms.
Two alternative possibilities emerge with respect to this issue. Either CER and national
environmental standards are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, firms with a high
level of CER will locate their foreign activities in countries with low environmental standards;
if they are complements, they will do so in countries with high environmental standards. This
paper aims at disentangling these two possibilities.
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If the hypothesis of complementarity is verified, it implies that firms consider their location
choices as part of their CER, depending on the level of a country’s standards. The substitution
hypothesis implies disentangling the link between CER and national standards. Several implica-
tions can follow. First, it is worth noticing that a firm locating its activities in a dirty country
can actually have good environmental performances. This may be the case if it decides to keep
implementing its home country’s environmental standards, whatever the level of the standards
in the country where it is investing. Second, one important feature of CER (as of all components
of CSR) is to go beyond (environmental) legislation. If the legal standards are weak, it is easier
for firms to practice CER. Investing in dirty countries can then be used as a means to minimize
the marginal cost of going beyond the legislation in terms of the environment. Third, and this
is related to the previous point, there may be significant gaps between the legislation and its
effective enforcement. In other words, it is important to explore the differences between de jure
and de facto environmental standards. A firm investing in countries where de facto standards
are low, while de jure standards are high can minimize its cost, while benefiting from a positive
image. Fourth, firms investing in dirty countries may compensate for this location choice by
good environmental performances, or firms which already have good CER may consider that it
is not risky to invest in such countries.
In order to know which hypothesis fits the data, we analyze the determinants of location
choices in 2010 for the 600 biggest European firms taking both the CER of firms and the countries’
environmental standards into account. We use a unique database provided by Vigeo in order to
assess their level of CER. The choice of location is provided by Orbis. Dealing with the de facto
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/ de jure issue requires two distinct measures of environmental standards. As for the empirical
methodology, we rely heavily on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) literature and we run many
robustness tests to assess the quality of the results.
We show that countries’ environmental standards have a negative impact on the probability
for firms with good environmental responsibility of being located abroad. This result clearly sup-
ports the substitution hypothesis. Firms located in countries with weak environmental regulation
are also more likely to be active in CER. However, this negative interaction effect is only signifi-
cant in the case of de facto environmental standards. This result is obtained while controlling for
an extensive set of firm characteristics and is robust to the use of different estimation techniques
and changes of sample. More specifically, we show that our results are not driven by one specific
sector or by firms coming from, or investing in, one specific country or group of countries. We
also find that firms with higher environmental responsibility tend more to be located abroad, all
things being equal.
The literature on the subject is still quite recent. An abundant literature has tried to deal with
the pollution haven hypothesis. According to Copeland & Taylor (2004), the PHH is verified
when pollution-intensive industries tend to move from countries with stringent environmental
regulations to countries with weaker ones. The problem is that it can be one determinant among
many others and it is very difficult to isolate the effect. The empirical evidence is therefore very
mixed. List & Co (2000) or Keller & Levinson (2002) find negative effects for the stringency of
environmental regulation on inbound FDI in the US. However, Eskeland & Harrison (2003) find
no robust correlation between environmental regulation in industrialized countries and foreign
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investment in developing countries. Cole et al. (2006) argue that one has to take the possible
influence of foreign firms on national environmental regulations into account, which would have
consequences on the identification of the PHH. They found that environmental regulations are
indeed positively influenced by the presence of foreign firms, at least when corruption is not
too high. Cole & Fredriksson (2009) show that environmental regulations are found to have a
negative impact on FDI only when treated as endogenous. It may explain why we cannot verify
the PHH in this paper.
Including CER in the analysis is even more recent. A seminal paper by Dam & Scholtens
(2008) is the first to study the relationship between the pollution haven hypothesis and the
environmental responsibility of firms. The authors show that firms exhibiting the highest envi-
ronmental responsibility levels tend to locate in less dirty countries. In another paper (Dam &
Scholtens, 2012), they show that firms which pollute more are located relatively more often in
countries with weak environmental regulations and that multinational firms do not significantly
influence local environmental regulations.
Hence, we complement their study by arguing that there is an important distinction to make
between CER improvement and current CER policies on the one hand and current environmen-
tal performances on the other hand. While Dam & Scholtens (2008) focused on the former,
we analyze the effect of the latter. A firm which has a strong experience with environmental
responsibility is less likely to exhibit a high dynamic of improvement, as we may expect that the
cost of improving CER increases marginally. Hence the firms which are currently improving their
CER the most are probably those that have the lowest starting point. The effects are therefore
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very likely to differ.
Whereas Dam and Scholtens find that firms which currently implement policies aiming at
improving their CER tend to avoid dirty countries, we show that firms that already have relatively
high environmental performances tend to locate in dirtier countries. One potential explanation
to the difference with their result is as follows. Firms which aim at improving their image through
CER may find that investing in dirty countries is risky. Indeed, any public information disclosing
such behavior would be extremely harmful to their reputation and the image of environmental
responsibility which they wish to promote. On the contrary, it is much easier to invest in dirty
countries for firms that have more experience in CER and that may be much more credible when
claiming that they behave well even in dirty countries. However, this effect is only significant
when taking de facto standards and not de jure ones into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and section 3
exposes the empirical strategy. The results are presented in section 4. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Measuring the Environmental Responsibility of Firms
2.1.1 The Vigeo Environmental Score
To assess the level of environmental responsibility of firms, we use the data provided by Vigeo,
the extra-financial rating agency. This environmental rating takes the following into account:
“the protection, safeguard, prevention of attacks on environment, implementation of an adequate
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managerial strategy, ecodesign, protection of biodiversity and reasonable control of environmental
impacts on the overall life cycle of products and services”.1 These objectives are evaluated by
Vigeo analysts according to 33 principles for action.2 Vigeo is the leading European expert in
the assessment of the practices and performances of firms on social, environmental and gover-
nance issues. Their rating received the CSRR-QS 2.1 certification of quality developed by the
Association of Independent Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility Research.
The extra-financial rating by Vigeo covers the 600 biggest European firms listed on DJS-
toxx600, EuroStoxx, SBF250, SBF120 or CAC40. Therefore, the span of our study is not limited
to voluntary firms, which would introduce a major selection bias in the analysis.3 We combine
our Vigeo dataset with Orbis, the ownership database provided by the Bureau van Dijk.4 We
use the procedure developed by Altomonte & Rungi (2013) to define the location of the firms in
the Vigeo dataset. The Vigeo sample of firms represents 11.80% of the Orbis database in terms
of total assets, but only 2.27% when we exclude financial firms. This can be explained by the
fact that firms in the financial sector are over-represented in our sample, and those firms have
very large total assets compared to firms in other sectors. Table 1 shows the share of firms by
1See http://www.vigeo.com/csr-rating-agency/en/2-2-referentiel-d-analyse for an explanation of
the research framework of Vigeo.
2Such principles for instance include the “identification, evaluation, and reduction of the risks of environmen-
tal accidents”, the “avoidance or reduction of the exploitation of sensitive ecosystems”, the “reduction of water
consumption”, or “the effective management of energy consumption and atmospheric emissions”.
3Since 2003, Vigeo has also been offering audit services to firms. But these two activities (the rating which
concerns all firms, and the audit which is a service provided to voluntary firms) are fully separated. Since 2010,
this separation between these two activities has been formally reinforced by the creation of two distinct business
brands: Vigeo rating and Vigeo enterprise. As mentioned on the Vigeo website, “The teams dedicated to SRI
research (Vigeo rating) and to audits on social responsibility (Vigeo enterprise) are clearly separated, so are their
workplaces. Less than 1% of the companies rated by Vigeo rating are clients of Vigeo enterprise”.
4Orbis covers around 100 million companies worldwide and provides information on shareholder links.
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sector, in our sample and in the total population of Orbis firms. As Vigeo scores the largest
firms in terms of market capitalization, some sectors (such as “Manufacturing” or “Financial and
Insurance Activities”) are obviously over-represented in our sample. However, these firms are
also the ones that are more likely to be located abroad, which is consistent with the purpose of
this paper.5
Table 1: Distribution of the Vigeo Sample
NACE 2-digit industry % of firms % of total assets
Vigeo Orbis Vigeo Orbis
Financial and Insurance Activities 20.33 6.06 80.81 70.34
Manufacturing 37.21 11.97 7.89 8.20
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning 4.72 0.58 3.25 2.18
Mining and Quarrying 3.27 0.31 2.46 1.70
Information and Communication 9.98 4.58 2.43 1.92
Construction 4.54 12.93 0.81 1.53
Wholesale and Retail Trade 4.54 20.14 0.75 2.81
Transportation and Storage 2.90 3.25 0.43 1.45
Administrative and Support Service Activities 2.72 5.46 0.28 1.41
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 2.18 12.30 0.25 4.46
Real Estate Activities 2.36 7.53 0.19 1.71
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management 0.91 0.48 0.17 0.27
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 1.81 3.74 0.14 0.33
Other Service Activities 0.18 3.07 0.06 0.63
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0.91 1.54 0.02 0.16
Public Administration and Defence 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.18
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.18 2.02 0.01 0.17
Others 0.00 3.93 0.00 0.56
Note: The data in the V igeo sample are calculated on the sample of the 551 firms
for which we have firm-level characteristics from Orbis. The data from the V igeo
and the whole Orbis samples are for the year 2010.
Within this 600-firm sample, we work with 551 firms for which we have data on other firm
characteristics thanks to the Orbis database. Those firm-level characteristics are presented in
subsection 2.3. We observe a huge heterogeneity across these 551 multinational firms, but also
5Notice that Vigeo does not do a systematic country by country audit when evaluating their CSR.
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across and within sectors. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for
each of the Nace 2-digit sectors. The “Transportation and Storage” sector has the highest mean
score (0.43), while the “Administrative and Support Service Activities” industry is the dirtiest
on average (0.279) when we exclude sectors with only one firm. These stylized facts highlight
the need to control for sector characteristics in our empirical work.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Environmental Vigeo Scores
Nace 2-digit Industry Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All 551 0.336 0.17 0 0.73
** Accommodation and Food Service Activities 10 0.328 0.116 0.13 0.57
Administrative and Support Service Activities 15 0.279 0.187 0 0.52
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 0.12 . 0.12 0.12
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 5 0.198 0.18 0 0.45
Construction 25 0.400 0.129 0.15 0.73
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning 26 0.405 0.094 0.2 0.58
Financial and Insurance Activities 112 0.302 0.188 0 0.67
Information and Communication 55 0.321 0.175 0 0.62
Manufacturing 205 0.345 0.17 0.02 0.71
Mining and Quarrying 18 0.408 0.104 0.13 0.55
Other Service Activities 1 0.23 . 0.23 0.23
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 12 0.288 0.135 0.12 0.49
Public Administration and Defense 1 0.16 . 0.16 0.16
Real Estate Activities 13 0.28 0.172 0.02 0.53
Transportation and Storage 16 0.43 0.218 0.01 0.7
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management 5 0.388 0.09 0.26 0.49
Wholesale and Retail Trade 25 0.331 0.144 0.05 0.59
Unclassified 6 0.317 0.126 0.14 0.48
Note: These statistics are calculated on the V igeo scores of the 551 firms for which
we have data from Orbis on firm characteristics.
Igalens & Gond (2005) have studied the relevance of Vigeo data.6 They found that “this
benchmark constitutes a proxy that is particularly suitable for Corporate social performance, at
least from a theoretical point of view ” (Igalens & Gond, 2005, p 143). They also consider that
6More precisely, they studied in 2000 the quality of ARESE data. Vigeo was founded in 2002, acquiring the
activities of ARESE. They continue to use a very similar research framework.
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these data are very similar to alternative measurements such as KLD indexes that have been
used intensively in the Anglo-American literature (see for instance Siegel & Vitalino 2007 for
an empirical analysis of CSR determinants using KLD data). The only differences are mainly
explained by “different cultural sensitivities (...) and differences in methodological orientation”.7
Chatterji et al. (2009) analyzes the relevance of KLD scoring. It includes measures of strengths8
and concerns9 that we meet in the 33 principles of action evaluated by Vigeo. Chatterji et al.
(2009) conclude that KLD data are good predictors of past environmental performances , but
much weaker predictors of future ones. If we assume that the results would be mostly similar
for Vigeo data10, our Vigeo rating of environmental responsibility is a good proxy for past
environmental performances. However, a possible drawback is that it is less fitted to assess the
evolution of these performances.
EIRIS data which are used by Dam & Scholtens (2008) may be more relevant if one wants
to measure the evolution of environmental performances. If EIRIS use a methodology similar to
KLD or Vigeo by looking at public data and relying on questionnaires sent to firms, they also “**
encourage the companies to address the issues of concern to investors and to improve their pub-
7See Igalens & Gond (2005) for an overview of these methodological differences. The authors conclude that
“The method used to assess the criteria that ARESE developed seems relatively more finely-tuned than its Anglo-
American counterpart” (p. 145).
8Beneficial products and services, Pollution prevention, Recycling, Clean energy, Communications, Property,
plant, and equipment, and Other strengths.
9Hazardous waste, Regulatory problems, Ozone-depleting chemicals, Substantial emissions, Agricultural chem-
icals, Climate change, and Other concerns.
10 Chatterji et al. (2009) observe the “ ‘real” environmental performance for US firms regulated by the US
Environmental Protection Agency for which they have the real level of carbon emissions and the number and
values of penalties associated with violations of major environmental laws. We do not have such information for
European firms. However, Igalens & Gond (2005) noted the relative similarity between both ratings.
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lic reporting”.11 The role of their scoring is not only to measure current performances , but also
to play a role in the evolution of these performances. Also, among all the indicators published by
EIRIS, Dam & Scholtens (2008) focus on four indicators of environmental responsibility: “envi-
ronmental policy”, “environmental management”, “environmental reporting” and “environmental
performance impact improvement”. All these indicators measure current policies and the evolu-
tions of environmental performances. The drawback is that this brings little information about
current environmental performances.12 Since we assume that the marginal cost of improving
CER is increasing, it is easier for a “dirty” company to improve its environmental impact , while
it is much more difficult to do so for a firm which has already invested a lot.
Vigeo and EIRIS therefore present different advantages , but also different drawbacks. As
they measure different dimensions of environmental responsibility, it is not surprising to obtain
different results. Our analysis is therefore complementary to that of Dam & Scholtens (2008).
We focus on the effect of current environmental performances , while they mainly focus on the
effect of the evolution of these performances.13
2.2 Measuring National Environmental Standards
There are two main approaches to measure the stringency of environmental standards: a de
jure and a de facto approach. The goal of the former is to give a quantitative assessment of
11See the presentation of their research on their website: http://www.eiris.org/managers/our_research.
html
12For instance, the environmental performance impact improvement is the score related to the following ques-
tion: “What level of improvements in environmental impact can the company demonstrate?”
13In order to test this idea, we perform estimations using the evolution of the Vigeo environmental score between
2006 and 2009. When doing so, we obtain results which are similar to Dam & Scholtens (2008).
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the stringency of environmental laws, whereas the goal of the latter is to assess the effects of
environmental laws on environmental quality. If the environmental legislation is fully effective,
any change in this legislation will have a direct impact on environmental quality. However,
the effectiveness of environmental policies depends on various factors. First, if the institutional
framework is too weak to ensure the effective enforcement of the law, legislation will have no
impact on the practices of firms and thus on environmental quality. Also, the effectiveness of
such legislation can be undermined by external forces such as tax evasion (in case of environ-
mental taxation) or a strategic behavior of firms aiming at evading the law. Therefore, de jure
environmental standards may not represent the real constraints which firms are facing.
This is why we propose to complement this analysis by focusing also on de facto standards.
The outcome of these policies is therefore the general environmental quality. However, we must
notice that environmental quality is not only determined by environmental policies , but of course
also by economic development among other factors. Yet, depending on the type of environmen-
tal quality under consideration, the effect will be very heterogeneous. The effect is particularly
strong when focusing on the case of carbon emission for instance.14 For many other dimensions,
economic development has the opposite effect. When considering wastes, the use of chemical
products or water sanitation, economic development tends to be positively correlated with en-
vironmental quality, mainly because of the development of appropriate policies to tackle these
issues. It is therefore very difficult to disentangle the effect of economic development and that
of environmental policies that can be endogenous to the level of economic development. How-
14According to the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), the effects are likely to be non-linear , but empirical
evidence of such a relation is scarce, at least for carbon emissions.
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ever, there is no doubt that an inefficient environmental policy has no impact on environmental
quality , while an efficient one tends to improve this quality. Environmental policies are also
very diverse and it is very difficult to assess their effective impact for a wide range of policies
and countries. For all these reasons, the de facto approach of environmental standards will focus
mainly on environmental quality. The underlying assumption is that this environmental quality
is positively influenced by the effectiveness of environmental policies.
Concerning de jure environmental standards, a commonly accepted approach is to approxi-
mate the level of environmental regulation by the number of international environmental treaties
ratified by a country and how many plans or strategies a country adopts.15 This statistic is pro-
vided by the World Bank (World Development Indicators) and used by Dam & Scholtens (2008).
Another limit of such a de jure approach should be pointed out. When focusing on international
conventions, it is essential to bear in mind that most treaties define several levels of commitment
depending on the level of development. For instance, the United Nations Convention on Climate
Change (UNCCC) makes a distinction between annex 1 (mostly industrialized countries and
countries in transition) and non-annex 1 countries. Only annex 1 countries have binding goals in
terms of GHC reduction according to the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore for non-annex 1 countries,
it is not costly to ratify such a protocol , as it does not imply any binding commitments to reduce
emissions.
The second approach relies on de facto measurements. The goal is not to measure the strin-
15Standardized values of the count of “Participation in treaties (Climate change, Ozone Layer, CFC control,
Law of the Sea, Biological diversity, Kyoto Protocol, CITES, CCD, Stockholm Convention)” and “Environmental
strategies or action plans” and “Biodiversity assessments, strategies or action plans” .
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gency of environmental regulations anymore, but to evaluate their real impact. As stated above,
it is not possible to directly assess the effectiveness of environmental legislation pas de virgule for
a wide range of policies and countries. We will therefore focus on the outcome of these policies
which is environmental quality. We are aware that un espace de trop ici this quality can be in-
fluenced by many other aspects, but countries with more ambitious and effective environmental
policies also tend to have better environmental quality. Therefore, we propose to use the Envi-
ronmental Performance Index (EPI, 2008) built by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and
Policy (YCELP) and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN,
Columbia University). It provides “quantitative metrics for evaluating a country’s environmental
performance in different policy categories relative to clearly defined targets”.16 It covers envi-
ronmental health, air quality, water resource management, biodiversity and habitat, forestry,
fisheries, agriculture, and climate change. The goal of this index is explicitly to “track policy
effectiveness through measurable outcomes”. Each indicator included in the EPI is associated
with a policy target. These policy targets are mainly drawn from international environmental
treaties, echoing our de jure index. To the best of our knowledge, the EPI is the most complete
index measuring real environmental performances for a large sample of countries.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for these variables and Table 4 shows the corre-
lation matrix between our two indexes of environmental standards, GDP and GDP per capita.
We can observe a very weak correlation between the indexes of environmental standards, which
justifies the use of both de jure and de facto indexes. We can also notice a weak correlation with
16** See http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/epi-environmental-performance-index-2010
for more details .
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GDP and GDP per capita. It is very close to 0 for treaties and 0.17 for the correlation between
GDP per capita and the EPI. If we have a look at some selected countries (see Table 5), we
can see some examples of large disparities between the ratification of treaties and environmental
performances. China for instance has ratified 11 treaties out of 12, but its EPI score is relatively
low. On the contrary, Germany has only ratified 9 treaties , but its EPI score is much higher.
It is noteworthy that a significant number of developing countries have excellent environmental
performances according to the EPI. Costa Rica was for instance ranked third (after Iceland and
Switzerland) in 2008. The position of the United States is ambivalent. Indeed, the number of
treaties it has ratified is very low, but its EPI score is fair but below the level observed for other
developed countries. This highlights the need to use different sets of indexes to assess the impact
of environmental regulation on the location choices of firms.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Environmental Indexes
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Treaties 140 9.357143 1.383726 1 11
EPI 140 0.7196143 0.1282365 0.391 0.955
Note: Treaties is the standardized value of the count of “Participation in treaties”,
“Environmental strategies or action plans” and “Biodiversity assessments, strategies
or action plans”. It is provided by the World Bank (WB) for 2009. EPI is the
Environmental Performance Index measured by the Yale Center for Environmental
Law and Policy and the CIESIN, Columbia University for 2008.
Table 4: Cross-Correlation Table
Variables Treaties EPI GDP GDP p.c.
Treaties 1
EPI -0.09 1
GDP -0.1001 0.56 1
GDP p.c. -0.0713 0.1712 0.3576 1
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Table 5: Environmental Country Indexes (Selected Countries)
Variables Treaties EPI
Argentina 10 81.8
Brazil 10 82.7
Canada 11 86.6
China 11 65.1
Costa Rica 11 90.5
France 10 87.8
Ghana 11 70.8
Germany 9 86.3
Japan 9 84.5
South Africa 10 69
South Korea 9 79.4
United Kingdom 11 86.3
United States 7 81
United Arab Emirates 8 64
To assess the robustness of our results, we also provide some robustness checks using alter-
native indexes both for de jure and de facto standards. The main problem with international
treaties is the heterogeneity in their nature. Some treaties are binding (such as the Kyoto Pro-
tocol), some are not (the Ozone Layer Treaty or the 1992 Climate Change Treaty). Also , some
treaties or environmental strategies are poorly connected with the stringency of regulations for
firms. The link between the location of firms and the existence of a national biodiversity action
plan or the country’s participation in the Law of the Sea is more likely to be weak. In addition,
we thus build two alternative indexes: the standardized value of the count of “participation in
binding treaties” (CFC control, Law of the Sea, Biological diversity, Kyoto Protocol, CITES,
CCD, Stockholm Convention) and the standardized value of the count of “participation in bind-
ing treaties related to air pollutants”17. The former variable is more likely to reflect the binding
constraints on firms. We will see that the results are similar when using these different indexes.
17CFC control, Kyoto Protocol, Stockholm Convention
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Concerning de facto standards, the alternative would be to focus on the subjective impact
of environmental legislation on firms , based on surveys of entrepreneurs. The World Business
Economic Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in various countries identifies the
percentage of firms considering environmental regulation as a major constraint. The problem of
such a variable, used by Dam & Scholtens (2008), is that the country coverage is low , with a
bias towards poor countries. Also , there are inherent error margins associated with any single
survey results that may alter the ability to compare across countries.18
2.3 Other Control Variables
We control both for firm and country characteristics that may explain the decision for a firm to
locate in a given country. To define such a set of control variables, we mainly follow Blonigen &
Piger (2011) whose goal is to define robust determinants of FDI. When country fixed effects are
not included, we use GDP and GDP per capita to control for the size of the market. We also add
a measure of market potential in the neighboring countries.19 All these variables come from the
World Development Indicators database. We also add a variable corresponding to the number
of business days it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm (in 2008), from the World Bank
Doing Business database. Finally, we use the distance between the country of the holding and
the subsidiary and a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when both countries share the same
language. Both variables are from CEPII (Mayer & Signago, 2006).
18This point is clearly mentioned in the condition of use of the WBES.
19This measure was firstly proposed by Harris (1954). Country i’s market potential is measured asMPi =
∑ xj
di,j
where xj is the GDP of country j and di,j is a measure of the geographical distance between countries i and j.
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At the level of the firm, we rely on variables used by Hakkala et al. (2008) and also propose a
specification close to the one used by Dam & Scholtens (2008). All variables are from Orbis. We
control for the assets, the age, the operating revenue, the liabilities, the liquidity and the total
number of employees. Compared with the specification of Dam & Scholtens (2008), we prefer to
use the asset level rather than the market capitalization , as the former is more stable than the
latter, especially in times of crisis. We also use the operational revenue rather than the level of
sales. The variable of sales is not available for banks and the financial sector. Using this variable
would introduce a sectoral bias in the analysis.
3 Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to study the interaction between the level of environmental performance of a firm
(measured by the Vigeo CER score) and national environmental standards (measured by a set
of de facto and de jure indexes) to explain the location choices of European firms. Arguably,
two main hypotheses can be made on this relation.
Hypothesis 1 Complementarity between CER and environmental standards: firms with a better
environmental performance invest more in countries with high environmental standards.
Hypothesis 2 Substitution between CER and environmental standards: firms with a better en-
vironmental performance invest less in countries with high environmental standards.
In order to discriminate between these two possible hypotheses, we estimate the effect of both
country-specific and firm-specific environmental practices on the location decision of a firm and
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the country of destination. The location decision is a discrete variable, which is equal to 1 if a
firm i is located in destination country d, and to 0 otherwise. Thus, the use of a probit model is
particularly appropriate.20 The probability of a firm i to be located in a destination country d is
Prob(Yid = 1) =

1 if αCERi + βEnv.Stdd + γCERi ∗ Env.Stdd +Ctrl+ id > 0
0 otherwise
(1)
where CERi is the Vigeo environmental performance of firm i and Env.Stdd is the environ-
mental standard in destination country d. CERi ∗ Env.Stdd is the interaction between both
firm-specific and destination country measures of environmental performance. We then include
a vector of control variables, Ctrl, which aims at capturing firm and destination country vari-
ables that influence the location decision of firm i in country d. Firm-level controls include the
logarithm of total assets, the operating revenue, liabilities, the number of employees, the age
and the liquidity ratio of the headquarters. We control for country characteristics such as the
logarithm of GDP, GDP per capita, market potential and the number of days needed to build
up a firm. We also include origin and destination country-specific variables to control for the
20We are aware that the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear models can bias the results due to the problem
of incidental parameters. However , we introduce these fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity which
can be important among countries and sectors. Furthermore, this bias seems to be large for samples with small
T which is not the case here. Hsiao (1996) has shown that the bias can be as much as +100% for T (i) = 2.
However, Heckman (1981) found in a Monte Carlo study that the bias was towards zero and the order of 10%
when T (i) = 8 and N = 100. This result has been widely discussed. Greene (2004) showed for instance that
the bias was more important even for T(i)=8 , but he found that this bias decreased strongly when T increased.
Also, the bias is much lower for marginal effects (on which we focus here). Fernández-Val (2009) showed that
“the bias [in average marginal effects] is negligible relative to the true average marginal effect for a wide variety
of distributions of regressors and individual effects and is identically zero in the absence of heterogeneity.” (p.72).
Considering the structure of our data, we therefore consider that the possible bias introduced by the inclusion of
fixed effects is more likely to be negligible and much less problematic than the omitted variable bias and problems
of unobserved heterogeneity that we will face if we do not include these fixed effects. Furthermore, as a robustness
check, we ran logit regressions and obtained perfectly similar results.
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effect of the distance and the common language between both countries on the location decision
of multinational firms. We finally also control for industry-specific and origin country-specific
potential omitted variables , including NACE 2-digit industry and origin country fixed effects.
If the complementarity hypothesis is verified, we expect a positive estimated coefficient for
interaction term (γ). For a given level of environmental standard, this would mean that firms with
a higher environmental performance tend to be located in countries with better environmental
performances. On the contrary, if the substitution hypothesis is verified, we expect the estimated
γ to be negative. Firms with a higher level of environmental performances would then tend to
be located in countries with lower environmental standards.
4 Results
De Jure Standards
Table 6 represents the result using the number of environmental treaties ratified as a proxy for
environmental policy.
We first estimate the effect of the environmental performance of a firm on the probability of
location abroad. We find that the effect of the CER index of environmental performance for a
firm is positive and significant, as shown in column (1) of Table 6. This specification includes
destination country, origin country, and NACE 2-digit industry fixed effects. These fixed effects
aim at controlling for the omitted variable bias, taking the potential difference in the origin
and destination country regulations into account, but also industry specificities that affect the
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location of firms. This last set of controls allows to control for the fact that for instance firms
in the Mining and Quarrying sector are more often located in countries with natural resources.
In column (2), we include our set of firm-level variables that control for firm characteristics
influencing the location decision, as their size and age. We also use bilateral control variables for
the distance and the common language between the origin and destination country, which are
known to significantly influence the location decision of firms in the FDI literature. We find that
the marginal effect of the environmental performance of a firm is lower (0.0227 against 0.2151),
but is still positive and highly significant. This first result suggests that the environmental
behavior of a firm is a significant determinant of its location decision.
In column (3), we then introduce the interaction term between the CER index and the de jure
index of environmental standards. We find no evidence that the effect of the environmental
performance of a firm on its location decision is conditional to environmental standards in des-
tination countries, measured at the de jure level. To test the robustness of our result on the
interaction term, we do not include the CER variable in column (4), and then introduce firm,
destination country fixed effects and bilateral country control variables. Even in this specifi-
cation that controls for firm and destination country omitted variables, the interaction term is
estimated to have no significant effect.
In column (5), we introduce destination country variables instead of fixed effects. The goal is to
be able to compute the magnitude of the interaction effect properly. In non-linear models, the
magnitude does not equal the marginal effect and can be of opposite sign. The Ai & Norton
(2003) procedure is then needed to correctly estimate these effects , but we need to include the
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two variables composing the interaction variable in the specification. This is not possible when
we include destination country fixed effects, so we introduce the main country characteristics
influencing FDI instead: GDP per capita, GDP, market potential and the number of business
days it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm. Our main result holds. The interaction effect
is not significant , while the environmental responsibility has a positive and significant impact
on the probability of being located abroad. It is noteworthy that our index of environmental
standards is positively correlated with the probability of being located in a country. This result
would invalidate the pollution haven hypothesis. It should however be interpreted very carefully.
As noticed by Cole et al. (2006) and Cole & Fredriksson (2009), environmental policies are likely
to be endogenous to FDI. Dealing with the endogeneity of environmental standards goes beyond
the goal of this paper.
All in all, we find no significant effect of de jure environmental standards on the effect of the
environmental responsibility of firms on their location choices. One potential explanation is the
gap between legislation and effective enforcement. Also, and as mentioned already, countries
have different commitments when ratifying an international treaty. Within the framework of
the UNCCC, non-annex 1 countries have no obligation to reduce their emissions. We should
therefore look at the possible effect of de facto environmental standards.
De Facto Standards
We now analyze the potential conditional effect of CER on de facto standards in the destination
country. Column (1) of Table 7 shows that the effect of the environmental performance of a
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firm is conditional on de facto standards. Indeed, the interaction term between CER and the
EPI measure of regulation has a negative and significant effect on the location of firms. This
negative effect of the interaction term is robust to the inclusion of a firm fixed effect, instead of
the firm-level control variables and industry and origin country fixed effects (column (2)). This
specification allows to ensure that the effect of the interaction term is not driven by firm or
destination country omitted variables.
Then we introduce destination country variables instead of fixed effects as we did in the pre-
vious set of estimates. The main result holds. The interaction effect is still negative and highly
significant. The estimated impact of corporate environmental responsibility remains very stable
with a positive coefficient of 0.03. The estimated coefficient for the EPI is positive and signif-
icant again, suggesting that firms locate in countries with higher environmental performances.
However, as noted above, great caution should be used in interpreting this result since we have
not controlled for the possible endogeneity of these standards. All other control variables have
the expected sign.21
Finally, we introduce conjointly the number of treaties and the EPI in columns (4) to (6). The
results are not affected by the common inclusion of both variables of countries’ environmental
standards. The interaction is still not significant for CER ∗#treaties , while it is negative and
significant for CER ∗ EPI. This last result confirms the heterogeneous effect of de jure and
21It is noteworthy that the sign of the GDP per capita coefficient has changed compared with the one obtained
in Table 6. The lack of stability of the estimated effect of GDP per capita is common in the literature. Blonigen &
Piger (2011) do not include it in the set of robust determinants of FDI which they elaborate. The main problem
of this variable is that it reflects two dimensions: consumers’ living standards , but also labor costs. Depending
on the main force driving FDI, the sign of the coefficient can either be positive or negative, but this would not
affect our results concerning our variables of interest. As shown in Table 4, the correlation between the EPI and
GDP per capita is very low (0.17).
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de facto standards. It is worth noticing that the estimated effect of national standards remains
positive and significant both for the number of treaties and the EPI. All other control variables
keep the same sign and significance.
All in all, we find that the environmental performance of a firm has a significant and positive
impact on its location abroad. However, this effect is conditional on de facto environmental
regulations in the destination country, not on de jure ones. More precisely, the country’s envi-
ronmental performance has a negative impact on the probability of environmentally responsible
firms locating abroad. This result validates the substitution hypothesis in opposition to the
complementary hypothesis.
Robustness Checks
We first test the robustness of our results running the specification presented in Tables 6 and 7
, but dropping one industry each time. The aim of this exercise is to test whether a sector is
driving our result. We find that the results obtained with both de jure and de facto measures
of environmental standards hold in all of these specifications. Similarly, we run regressions
excluding firms from one of the origin countries each time, and find that our results still hold in
each of the specifications, and are thus not driven by firms from a particular country. Finally,
we run regressions excluding destination countries by group each time. We consider 12 groups
of countries here, defined on a geographical basis.22 In the case of de jure standards, our result
22We classify countries as being part of one of the following groups: Europe, North America, South America,
Central America, Middle East, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, North Africa, Rest of
Africa and Pacific.
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holds for all specifications. However, we find that in the case of de facto standards, our results
are robust in all of these specifications, except for the specification in which we exclude Europe
from the list of potential destination countries. In this case, the effect of the environmental
performance of firms is not estimated to be conditional on destination country regulations. All
of these results are robust when we use logit or nested logit estimations, and when we run the
Ai & Norton (2003) procedure. We lastly use alternative indexes of countries’ environmental
performances in our estimations. The results concerning “Air pollutant treaties” and “binding
treaties” are perfectly similar. However, when using WBES, the interaction variable is not
significant, but this can easily be explained by the strong reduction in the sample size and the
problems of international comparability mentioned in the condition of use of this database.
All results are available upon request.
Further Analysis
We calculate the estimated marginal effects for both the EPI and CER. The effect of a one
standard deviation increase in the CER index on the probability that a firm be located in a
given country when the EPI is at its mean (0.72) is 0.006 (= 0.0349∗0.17). Furthermore, we
find that the estimated marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the environmental
responsibility of a firm on its probability of being located in a country decreases with the country’s
EPI. More precisely, the positive estimated marginal effect of the CER index becomes negative
for countries with an EPI score of 0.8874 or more. The first country that has an EPI score
greater than 0.8874 is Latvia (0.888). The group of countries for which the marginal effect of the
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CER index is negative represents 5% of our sample of 140 countries. Furthermore, 5 of the 7
countries in that group which are above this threshold are located in Europe. This could explain
why we do not find that the effect of the CER index is conditional on the destination country’s
EPI score when we exclude European countries from the analysis. Similarly, we calculate the
estimated marginal effect of the EPI and find that it decreases with the CER index , but that
it is positive on the whole distribution of CER indexes. The estimated marginal effect of a one
standard deviation increase in the EPI when the CER index is at its mean (0.336) is 0.03.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Focusing on the current environmental performances of firms rather than on their current man-
agerial decisions gives a completely different picture from the one described by Dam & Scholtens
(2008). Our main result is that firms with good environmental performances tend to be located
in “dirtier” countries, at least pas de virgule when considering de facto national performances in
terms of environment. More precisely, we show that national environmental performances play a
negative role in the positive effect of the environmental responsibility of firms on their probability
of being located abroad. This result is robust to various specifications and econometric meth-
ods. This result tends to confirm the substitution hypothesis between CER and environmental
standards.
It is worth noticing that the negative interaction term which we found between CER and
national standards is only significant when considering de facto standards, but is not significant
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when considering de jure ones. One may think that being located in countries with very weak en-
vironmental legislation is counterproductive for a firm which aims at improving its environmental
responsibility. However, as it is much more complicated to observe a country’s real environmental
performance, this limitation is raised for countries which have a good environmental legislation,
but enforce it poorly. One possible explanation is that firms which invest in dirty countries must
have a higher level of CER to minimize the risk of reputation loss.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this result; advocating one or the other is left
for future research. The first hypothesis is that firms may compensate for their investments in
CER in developed countries by adopting a pure cost minimizing behavior when locating abroad.
In other words, firms may relocate their irresponsibility abroad and try to hide it. Ratifying
environmental agreements to improve a country’s image or reputation without ensuring that
these agreements are respected may then be a deliberate strategy for states, thus offering firms
an apparently clean image with significant tolerance in fact in day to day business.
However, the other hypothesis is that these firms actually perform well in these countries.
This would be consistent with the general observation that foreign firms tend to perform better
than local ones. This can be positive for these countries, as it may reinforce their environmental
performances in the long run. It may explain why we found a positive relation between a
country’s environmental performance and the probability for a firm of being located in this
country. Nevertheless, it raises the issue of the motivation of firms that deliberately choose to
invest in countries with poor environmental performances, even if these firms actually perform
well in terms of environment.
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More generally, we have shown that firms with relatively good environmental performances
tend to be located abroad more often than other firms, all other things being equal. There is no
apparent contradiction for a firm between being responsible and being multinational.
This paper has shown that good CER firms can either be angels, locating in dirty countries
and thus allowing these countries to improve their environmental standards; or demons, trying
to hide their negative environmental behaviors abroad by exploiting the difference between de
facto and de jure standards. Further investigations are therefore needed, in particular to explain
the motivations of firms that both invest in CER and locate in dirty countries.
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Table 6: Location Determinants: Effect of CER and De Jure Standards
Dependant Variable Location
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CER 0.2151*** 0.0227*** 0.0220*** 0.0259***
(0.0081) (0.00740) (0.00742) (0.00786)
CER * # of Treaties 0.00494 0.00213 0.00810
(0.00488) (0.00257) (0.00524)
# of Treaties 0.0150***
(0.00156)
Distance -0.0838*** -0.0839*** -0.0481*** -0.0353***
(0.00704) (0.00704) (0.00441) (0.00311)
Com. Language 0.0428*** 0.0428*** 0.0294*** 0.0503***
(0.00724) (0.00724) (0.00485) (0.0108)
Assets 0.0122** 0.0122** 0.0129**
(0.00532) (0.00532) (0.00620)
Age 0.0129*** 0.0129*** 0.0147**
(0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00218)
Op. Revenue 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0550***
(0.00255) (0.00255) (0.00324)
Liabilities -0.0268*** -0.0268*** -0.0294***
(0.00456) (0.00456) (0.00535)
Liquidity 0.00777*** 0.00778*** 0.00948***
(0.00247) (0.00247) (0.00292)
# of Employees 0.00395*** 0.00395*** 0.00436***
(0.000424) (0.000424) (0.000473)
GDP per Capita 0.0150***
(0.00231)
GDP 0.0496***
(0.00183)
Market Potential 0.00769
(0.00783)
# of Days -0.00650***
(0.00241)
Observations 51,649 51,649 51,649 51,649 48,256
Pseudo R2 0.382 0.443 0.443 0.567 0.401
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the origin-destination country pair level in
parentheses,*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. Probit estimations including
origin country, destination country, and NACE industry fixed effects in specifications 1 to
4. Specification 5 includes origin country and NACE industry fixed effects. Marginal effects
computed at means. CER is the firm-level V igeo score of Corporate Environmental
Responsibility. # of Treaties is the destination country-specific standardized values of
the count of “Participation in treaties (Climate change, Ozone Layer, CFC control, Law
of the Sea, Biological diversity, Kyoto Protocol, CITES, CCD, Stockholm Convention)”
and “Environmental strategies or action plans” and “Biodiversity assessments, strategies or
action plans”, provided by the World Bank. Both CEP and # of Treaties are centered.
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Table 7: Location Determinants: Effect of CER and De Facto Standards
Dependant Variable Location
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CER 0.0305*** 0.0349*** 0.0345*** 0.0374***
(0.00694) (0.00786) (0.00756) (0.00841)
CER * EPI -0.168*** -0.0831*** -0.208*** -0.186*** -0.0449** -0.219***
(0.0485) (0.0274) (0.0585) (0.0533) (0.0210) (0.0622)
EPI 0.231*** 0.195***
(0.0585) (0.0283)
CER * # Treaties 0.00377 0.00179 0.00599
(0.00501) (0.00174) (0.00511)
# Treaties 0.0116***
(0.00156)
Distance -0.0796*** -0.0439*** -0.0316*** -0.0856*** -0.0377*** -0.0331***
(0.00669) (0.00414) (0.00302) (0.00722) (0.00348) (0.00303)
Com. Language 0.0403*** 0.0272*** 0.0514*** 0.0436*** 0.0298*** 0.0539***
(0.00698) (0.00457) (0.0107) (0.00750) (0.00436) (0.0109)
Assets 0.0121** 0.0122** 0.0121** 0.0125**
(0.00507) (0.00559) (0.00551) (0.00599)
Age 0.0121*** 0.0131*** 0.0132*** 0.0141***
(0.00178) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00209)
Op. Revenue 0.0458*** 0.0495*** 0.0502*** 0.0531***
(0.00434) (0.00305) (0.00264) (0.00319)
Liabilities -0.0257*** -0.0270*** -0.0275*** -0.0285***
(0.00434) (0.00482) (0.00473) (0.00517)
Liquidity 0.00735*** 0.00398*** 0.00791*** 0.00926***
(0.00236) (0.00265) (0.00258) (0.00282)
# of Employees 0.00369*** 0.00398*** 0.00400*** 0.00423***
(0.000402) (0.000426) (0.000438) (0.000456)
GDP per capita -0.00526** 0.00248
(0.00266) (0.00307)
GDP 0.0484*** 0.0494***
(0.00667) (0.00177)
Market Potential 0.00667 0.00706
(0.00722) (0.00763)
# of Days -0.00901*** -0.00738***
(0.00226) (0.00234)
Observations 51,649 51,649 49,764 49,387 49,387 48,256
Pseudo R2 0.445 0.569 0.405 0.442 0.570 0.404
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the origin-destination country pair level in parentheses,*** sig-
nificant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. Probit estimations including origin country, destination country,
and NACE industry fixed effects in specifications 1, 2, 4 and 5. Specifications 3 and 6 include firm and
destination country fixed effects. Marginal effects computed at means. CER is the firm-level V igeo score
of Corporate Environmental Responsibility. EPI is the destination country-specific Environmental
Performance Index provided by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP) and
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. # of
Treaties is the destination country-specific standardized values of the count of “Participation in treaties”
and “Environmental strategies or action plans” and “Biodiversity assessments, strategies or action plans”,
provided by the World Bank. Both CER, EPI and # of Treaties are centered.
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